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DEFICIT FRAME DANGERS 
Jonathan P. Feingold 
ABSTRACT 
Civil rights advocates have long viewed litigation as an essential, 
if insufficient, catalyst of social change. In part, it is. But in critical 
respects that remain underexplored in legal scholarship, civil rights 
litigation can hinder short- and long-term projects of racial justice. 
Specifically, certain civil rights doctrines reward plaintiffs for 
emphasizing community deficits—or what I term a “deficit frame.” 
Legal doctrine, in other words, invites legal narratives that track, 
activate, and reinforce pernicious racial stereotypes. This dynamic, 
even in the context of well-intended litigation, risks entrenching 
conditions that drive racial inequality—including the conditions that 
litigation is often intended to address. To concretize the theory, this 
Article explores how deficit frames can influence the behavior of four 
key constituencies who impact—and often undermine—the pursuit of 
educational equality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Civil Rights Catch 22s,1 I detail how certain civil rights 
doctrines reward plaintiffs who deploy narratives that track racial 
stereotypes and regressive theories of inequality. Educational 
adequacy claims, in which public school students challenge the 
substantive conditions of their education, offer a prime example.2 
Under prevailing doctrine, for any chance at success, litigants must 
establish that they have been deprived a “minimally adequate 
education.” 3 
This high burden incentivizes plaintiffs to conjure an image of 
community impoverishment and academic incompetence.4 Strategic 
plaintiffs respond in kind. Yet in so doing, they deploy statistics and 
stories prone to activate and entrench invidious stereotypes about 
Black and Brown students. The litigation, in other words, can calcify 
conditions that often drive inequality—even if the plaintiffs prevail. 
In Catch 22s, I explore this dynamic through Gary B. v. Whitmer, 
a 2016 school financing lawsuit that targeted several of Detroit’s 
most under-resourced public schools.5 The litigants, low-income 
Black and Latino students, claimed that Michigan had deprived them 
access to “foundational literacy”—that is, the basic ability to read 
and write.6 The plaintiffs (and their attorneys) anchored this claim to 
a litany of anecdotes and data documenting the community’s 
 
 1. See Jonathan Feingold, Civil Rights Catch 22s, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2022). 
 2. See id.; see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for A Collaborative Enforcement Model 
for A Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1668 (2007). 
 3. Even satisfying this factual showing does not guarantee legal relief. The Supreme Court has held 
that the U.S. Constitution does not create a general right to education. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973). Nonetheless, it remains an open question whether “a minimally 
adequate education is a fundamental right.” See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986); see also 
Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616, 644 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated, 958 F.3d 1216 (concluding that the 
U.S. Constitution guarantees a “minimally adequate education”). In recent cases, plaintiffs, to varying 
success, have predicated their adequacy claims on this open legal question. Compare Gary B., 957 F.3d 
at 644, with A.C. v. Raimondo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 170, 192 (D.R.I. 2020). 
 4. See Feingold, supra note 1 (outlining high legal and factual hurdles plaintiffs must overcome to 
prevail on a federal adequacy claim). 
 5. 957 F.3d at 620–21. 
 6. Id. 
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academic impoverishment and underachievement.7 In effect, the 
Gary B. plaintiffs framed themselves and their community through a 
narrative of poverty and illiteracy.  
Given doctrinal demands, this “deficit frame”8 made sense; in fact, 
it propelled the plaintiffs to a historic victory before the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and a sizable settlement that followed.9 
Yet even if rational and efficacious from a litigation standpoint—and 
even though the plaintiffs’ victory warranted celebration—the 
framing posed non-trivial risks. Specifically, by mobilizing a legal 
narrative that tracks pernicious anti-Black stereotypes, the lawsuit 
risked entrenching structural and behavioral forces that perpetuate 
racial inequities in Detroit and beyond. In Catch 22s, I surface this 
threat.10 Here, to deepen the analysis, I explore how exposure to 
racialized deficit frames could lead key stakeholders to engage in 
conduct or adopt policies that hinder educational equality. 
Specifically, I focus on the following four constituencies: (1) white 
parents, (2) teachers, (3) voters, and (4) school administrators. 
This analysis, which focuses on individual actors, is inherently 
limited. Nonetheless, I highlight the relationship between legal 
narratives and stakeholder behavior for two principal reasons. First, 
 
 7. Id. at 627–28. To a significant degree, I use the terms “litigants” and “plaintiffs” as a catch-all to 
capture the various actors that frame affirmative arguments in the course of litigation. This includes the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Although beyond the scope of this Symposium Article, any engagement with legal 
storytelling surfaces a longstanding debate about the proper role of civil rights attorneys vis-à-vis their 
clients. This debate includes questions about who is empowered to frame legal narratives and social 
realities. See generally GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING (1992). Although beyond the scope of 
this Article, such questions deserve mention—particularly given the race and class gaps that often 
separate civil rights attorneys and the communities they represent. 
 8. See Feingold, supra note 1 (defining “deficit frame” as storytelling that foregrounds and 
emphasizes what a group lacks (or is perceived to lack)). 
 9. See Press Release, Gretchen Whitmer, Gov. of Michigan, Governor Whitmer and Plaintiffs 
Announce Settlement in Landmark Gary B. Literacy Case (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/0,9309,7-387-90499_90640-529231—,00.html 
[https://perma.cc/5S7A-YXN7]. The settlement provided, inter alia, $280,000 for the named plaintiffs; 
$2.72 million for Detroit public schools; and a commitment to seek at least $94.4 million for literacy-
related programs and initiatives. Press Release, supra.  
 10. Feingold, supra note 1. See generally Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial 
Disparities in Incarceration Increase Acceptance of Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1949 (2014) 
(observing that white voters became more supportive of punitive policies after exposure to severe racial 
disparities). 
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these stakeholders—through their individual and collective action—
have an outsized impact on America’s educational landscape. 
Second, this analysis illuminates how racial inequality often flows 
from intersecting individual, structural, and discursive sources. 
Before turning to this analysis, however, I ground the conversation 
by briefly reviewing the racial biases literature. 
I. THE BASICS: FROM BIAS TO BEHAVIOR 
The extensive research on racial biases is not new to legal 
scholarship.11 This review is correspondingly concise. 
To begin, a “bias” refers to any number of systemic errors in 
human judgment or decision-making that deviate from a neutral 
baseline.12 Biases pertaining to social categories such as race, gender, 
or age often comprise one of two constructs: “attitudes” or 
“stereotypes.”13 
An attitude is an association between a concept or category and an 
emotional or evaluative valence—e.g., positive versus negative or 
like versus dislike.14 If a person prefers musicians to lawyers, or 
K-Pop to Alt-Rock, those preferences constitute attitudes. A 
stereotype, in contrast, refers to an association between a concept or 
category and a particular trait or characteristic.15 If a person thinks all 
 
 11. See generally Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the 
Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010) (reviewing the literature). 
 12. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 (2012) (“We 
suffer from a long litany of biases, most of them having nothing to do with gender, ethnicity, or race.”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. The term “prejudice” is susceptible to multiple meanings, some of which overlap with my use 
of the term “attitudes.” See Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification–Suppression Model 
of the Expression and Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCH. BULL. 414, 414 (2003) (“[P]rejudice [is] a 
negative evaluation of a social group or a negative evaluation of an individual that is significantly based 
on the individual’s group membership.”). 
 15. See Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1128 n.9 (“If the association is nearly perfect, in that almost 
every member of the social group has that trait, then we think of the trait less as a stereotype and more 
as a defining attribute. Typically, when we use the word ‘stereotype,’ the correlation between social 
group and trait is far from perfect.”); see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 949 (2006). 
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lawyers are dishonest “ambulance chasers,” or that all musicians are 
irresponsible, those associations constitute stereotypes.16 
In recent years, implicit biases have garnered increased attention 
within lay discourse and academic scholarship. Implicit biases refer 
to attitudes and stereotypes measured through indirect techniques.17 
The most well-known indirect measure is the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT).18 In contrast to implicit biases, explicit biases comprise 
attitudes or stereotypes measured through direct techniques.19 This 
includes, for example, survey instruments that ask respondents to 
share opinions about, e.g., different ice cream flavors; social media 
platforms; or racial groups.20 
Implicit biases, including those concerning racial groups, are 
pervasive and consequential.21 Specifically, implicit biases have been 
shown to influence human judgment and decision-making across 
domains, particularly in socially sensitive contexts such as interracial 
interactions.22 
So where do these pervasive biases come from? Often, implicit 
(and explicit) biases derive from vicarious experiences with 
individuals from racial out-groups.23 Vicarious experiences refer to 
 
 16. See Kang et al., supra note 12, at 1128–29. Attitudes and stereotypes do not always align. Id. 
Asian Americans, for example, have been viewed as intelligent and industrious (positive stereotypes), 
yet subject to public disdain (a negative attitude). Id. at 1126. See generally Brian A. Nosek et al., 
Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 36 
(2007). 
 17. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Revolution: Reconceiving the 
Relation Between Conscious and Unconscious, 72 AM. PSYCH. 861, 861–62 (2017). 
 18. See id. at 866. 
 19. Id. at 861. 
 20. Jerry Kang, Rethinking Intent and Impact: Some Behavioral Realism About Equal Protection, 66 
ALA. L. REV. 627, 630 (2015). 
 21. Id. at 629–30. 
 22. See id. at 630 (discussing meta-analyses of implicit bias); see also Galen V. Bodenhausen & 
Kurt Hugenberg, Attention, Perception, and Social Cognition, in SOCIAL COGNITION: THE BASIS OF 
HUMAN INTERACTION 1, 11 (Fritz Strack & Jens Forster eds., 2009) (“In general, social attitudes and 
expectancies can exert many noteworthy effects on what people perceive and how they perceive 
it . . . .”). See generally Anthony Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association 
Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 17 (2009). 
 23. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1166 (2000) (“From youth, we infuse 
racial categories with meanings based on ‘experiences’ with people mapped to these [racial] 
categories.”). Biases can also come from direct experiences. Id. But given hyper-segregation in the 
United States, particularly among whites, intergroup interactions are often vicarious. See Michelle 
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“imagined experiences—both fictional and nonfictional—that are 
mediated through stories told by parents, teachers, friends, and 
increasingly by the electronic mass media.”24 As a result, popular 
culture—transmitted through traditional mass media, local news, and 
social media—comprises a potent conduit of racial biases.25 Civil 
rights attorneys and litigants, through the legal narratives they 
disseminate, can influence the racial narratives that circulate within 
this information ecosystem.26 
Building on this overview, I now turn to our four featured 
constituencies. Although a thought experiment of sorts, the following 
analysis illuminates how well-intended legal narratives can produce 
perverse effects. 
II. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
A. “Nice White Parents”27: The Neighborhood Profiling Trap 
Racial segregation has become an enduring and defining element 
of American life.28 Segregation—and housing policy more broadly—
 
Wilde Anderson & Victoria C. Plaut, Property Law: Implicit Bias and the Resilience of Spatial 
Colorlines, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 25, 27 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith 
eds., 2012) (discussing hyper-segregation); Thomas J. Sugrue, Expert Report of Thomas J. Sugrue, 5 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 261, 265 (1999) (“[F]ew Americans of different racial and ethnic backgrounds 
interact in a meaningful way on a daily basis.”). 
 24. Kang, supra note 23; see also ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN 
THE WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 49 (2000) (suggesting that vicarious exposure to 
racial out-groups dominates in the construction of mainstream culture); Srividya Ramasubramanian, 
Television Viewing, Racial Attitudes, and Policy Preferences: Exploring the Role of Social Identity and 
Intergroup Emotions in Influencing Support for Affirmative Action, 77 COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 102, 
103 (2010) (“Media messages, along with numerous other factors such as family and friends, play a 
crucial role in forming and maintaining social stereotypes.”). 
 25. Cf. Srividya Ramasubramanian, The Impact of Stereotypical Versus Counterstereotypical Media 
Exemplars on Racial Attitudes, Causal Attributions, and Support for Affirmative Action, 38 COMMC’N 
RSCH. 497, 500 (2011) (“Portrayals of race/ethnicity on television not only lead to biased perceptions 
about how racial groups differ from each other along various traits and characteristics, but also offer 
suggestions for why subordinate groups deserve their assigned positions.”). 
 26. For further analysis concerning the potential for civil rights litigation to impact already pervasive 
racial biases, see Feingold, supra note 1. 
 27. In July 2020, the New York Times released Nice White Parents, a podcast that explored the 
outsized impact well-meaning white parents have had on public education in the United States. See 
Introducing: Nice White Parents, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/podcasts/nice-
white-parents-serial.html [https://perma.cc/CT95-36JA] (Dec. 4, 2020). 
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is also inseparable from an education landscape where race and class 
often dictate a student’s access to well-resourced public schools.29 
This dynamic exists against a historical backdrop in which 
predominately white communities have hoarded critical resources.30 
The foregoing suggests that reducing racial segregation offers one 
path to better equalize educational opportunities.31 We might ask, 
accordingly, how one would undertake such an effort? 
To start, federal law offers little help.32 As education scholar Erika 
Wilson summarizes: “the Supreme Court’s remedial school 
desegregation jurisprudence places the problem of school segregation 
caused by residential segregation outside the purview of the federal 
courts’ remedial powers.”33 In other words, absent a facially 
discriminatory policy, the Supreme Court has effectively inoculated 
 
 28. See Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Erika K. 
Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in Education Through the No Child Left Behind Act 
Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 645 (2011). 
 29. See Thomas Kleven, Federalizing Public Education, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 394 (2010) (“[D]ue 
to the demographic differences among local governments, public education in the United States is 
significantly segregated along class and race lines.”). Although we often conflate race and class 
segregation, residential segregation in the United States tracks more closely with race than it does class. 
See Reynolds Farley et al., Stereotypes and Segregation: Neighborhoods in the Detroit Area, 100 AM. J. 
SOCIO. 750, 751 (1994) (“If residential segregation were a matter of income, rich blacks would live with 
rich whites and poor blacks with poor whites. This does not happen.”). 
 30. For decades, a host of private and public forces—including the law—have incentivized whites to 
propagate, live in, and maintain racially exclusionary communities. See generally K-Sue Park, How Did 
Redlining Make Money?, JUST MONEY (Sept. 25, 2020), https://justmoney.org/k-sue-park-how-did-
redlining-make-money [https://perma.cc/4S4F-YRPG]. 
 31. I am not suggesting that residential integration is, or should be privileged as, the key to greater 
K–12 educational equality. Nor do I mean to discount how white communities have long engaged in 
legal and non-legal measures—including harassment and violence—to maintain racially exclusive 
neighborhoods. See generally JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE 
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING (2013). Nonetheless, I focus on 
integration because segregation—or more precisely, the erection and maintenance of racially exclusive 
white spaces—has long fueled educational inequality. See generally Erika K. Wilson, Monopolizing 
Whiteness, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2382 (2021). 
 32. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model for a Federal 
Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1660–67 (2007) (describing the federal judiciary’s 
failure to realize effective school desegregation plans); LaToya Baldwin Clark, Education As Property, 
105 VA. L. REV. 397, 399 (2019) (“Due to Milliken, moving children across school district boundaries to 
equalize education was no longer a viable option.”); Wilson, supra note 28, at 628 (“Doctrinally, 
the . . . federal judiciary is situated such that it cannot adequately address issues of racial and economic 
inequality in schools.”). 
 33. Wilson, supra note 28, at 649. 
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racial segregation in our schools and neighborhoods from legal 
attack. 
Recognizing the limits of litigation, an alternative strategy might 
instead focus on influencing behavior. More precisely, one might try 
to incentivize upper- and middle-class white parents to desegregate 
their communities—and thereby make the resources in those 
communities accessible to all. Among other challenges, pro-white 
racial biases—explicit and implicit—continue to inform housing 
preferences contrary to such efforts.34 This includes the presumption 
that whiter neighborhoods have better schools—the precise bias that 
cases like Gary B. risk activating and reproducing.35 
Imagine a white parent in search of her first home.36 Among other 
considerations, our parent prioritizes high-quality schools.37 To 
gauge options, she spends an afternoon driving through 
neighborhoods scattered around the city where she lives. As she 
drives, the parent attends to various environmental cues that signal 
each neighborhood’s socioeconomic make-up. Why care about class? 
Because even if our parent is not an expert in public school 
financing, she intuits—correctly—that a wealthier district (with its 
higher tax base) means more educational resources (relative to poorer 
districts). 
 
 34. See Sheryll D. Cashin, Middle-Class Black Suburbs and the State of Integration: A 
Post-Integrationist Vision for Metropolitan America, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 729, 737 (2001) (“[B]lacks, 
like whites, now appear to prefer an integrated neighborhood in which their own group is in the 
majority.”). 
 35. See Ann Owens, Racial Residential Segregation of School-Age Children and Adults: The Role of 
Schooling As a Segregating Force, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 63, 77 (2017) (“[W]hite 
parents seem to avoid living in school districts where black and Hispanic children live, perhaps because 
they use racial composition as a proxy for neighborhood—and local neighborhood school—quality.”). 
 36. Although more acute among parents, one might expect a similar decision-making process to 
extend to nonparents, realtors, and lenders. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: 
HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE 
POLICIES 149–52 (2001) (observing that homeowners without children are likely concerned with local 
public schools given the expected correlation between school quality and property values). 
 37. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling Homeownership: Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 119 
YALE L.J. 1904, 1915 (2010) (reviewing LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY 
VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES (2009)) (identifying “high-quality public schools, safe communities, 
and efficient governmental services” as policies homeowners demand of local government). 
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Beyond class, our parent might also attend to each neighborhood’s 
racial identity.38 Why? Because she likely presumes that the whiter 
the neighborhood, the better the school.39 If pressed, our parent might 
explain that she is not prejudiced against the poor or people of color. 
Really, she would love for her children to attend a “diverse” school, 
but she prioritizes a high-quality education over all else. It just so 
happens, she might continue, that money matters and “green follows 
white.”40 
In other words, our white parent defends her class- and race-based 
neighborhood preference as “rational discrimination” driven by an 
accurate, if unpleasant, empirical backdrop. One can understand this 
logic as a form of racial profiling—but one that implicates 
neighborhoods, not individuals. Rather than assess each 
neighborhood on its own merits, our parent openly employs race and 
class proxies for school quality.41 Education scholar Jack Schneider 
describes the rationale as follows: 
Knowing that students of color have long been denied 
equal educational opportunities, middle-class white parents 
often shy away from schools with large concentrations of 
black and brown students. In so doing, they exacerbate 
segregation, take their high levels of capital elsewhere, and 
ensure that people like them continue to avoid schools with 
large populations of color.42 
 
 38. See JACK SCHNEIDER, BEYOND TEST SCORES: A BETTER WAY TO MEASURE SCHOOL QUALITY 3 
(2017) (“Many parents also tend to use race as a proxy for school quality.”).  
 39. See id. 
 40. Richard Thompson Ford, Brown’s Ghost, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1309 (2004) (“The 
presumption underlying this position is that the politically empowered majority will improve the schools 
used by the relatively powerless minority if and only if their own children attend those schools as well: 
‘green follows white,’ the old motto holds.”). 
 41. See Maria Krysan et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Racial Beliefs and Residential Segregation, 
5 DU BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RSCH. ON RACE 1, 16 (2008) (“In the absence of any other information, 
Whites assume that neighborhoods where Blacks live have less expensive housing, are less safe, are less 
likely to appreciate in value, and have lower-quality schools than do identical neighborhoods with White 
residents.”). 
 42. SCHNEIDER, supra note 38; see also Krysan et al., supra note 41, at 19 (“Whites avoid Black or 
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Racial profiling, when framed as rational discrimination, often 
enjoys common-sense appeal. Nonetheless, the empirical case for 
profiling—not to mention its normative purchase43—is fragile at 
best.44 At a minimum, our white parent must (a) hold accurate 
probabilities in her head, and (b) act on those probabilities 
rationally.45 Both conditions are dubious. First, even if whiter 
neighborhoods tend to have higher tax bases,46 the biases that 
undergird profiles rarely anchor to precise and accurate base rates.47 
Rather, profiles tend to reflect overbroad generalizations and societal 
stereotypes. In our hypothetical, for example, prevailing stereotypes 
are prone to conjure a “typical” Black community defined by 
“lower-cost homes, poorly performing schools, and considerable 
[crime] risks.”48 
Second, even when we possess accurate information in our heads, 
that knowledge rarely translates to rational behavior or 
decision-making.49 Due to a constellation of cognitive biases and 
heuristics, people tend to interpret information in ways that confirm 
existing hypotheses or stereotypes.50 As a result, the profile—and the 
stereotypes on which it rests—will likely influence our parent’s 
 
racially mixed neighborhoods . . . because of the negative characteristics associated with those 
neighborhoods.”). 
 43. Among myriad moral considerations, racial profiling stigmatizes its targets and departs from the 
basic commitment to judge individuals by their character, not their color. See generally Devon Carbado 
& Jonathan Feingold, Whren v. United States, in CRITICAL RACE JUDGMENTS (forthcoming 2022) 
(discussing racial profiling’s stigmatic harm). 
 44. Kang & Lane, supra note 11, at 514.  
 45. Id. (“The descriptive claim of accuracy itself comprises two sub-claims: We carry accurate 
probabilities in our heads (the accurate probability data claim), and we act on the basis of those 
probabilities rationally (the rational processing claim).”). 
 46. But see generally JACK SCHNEIDER ET AL., SCHOOL INTEGRATION IN MASSACHUSETTS: RACIAL 
DIVERSITY AND STATE ACCOUNTABILITY (2020) (questioning the presumption that residential 
segregation predicts school quality). 
 47. Kang & Lane, supra note 11, at 514 (explaining that profiles often fail to satisfy “at least three 
different and potentially unrelated accuracy measures”). 
 48. Krysan et al., supra note 41, at 19. 
 49. See Kang & Lane, supra note 11, at 516 (“We are, in fact, terrible calculators of probabilities, 
and our behaviors do not seem rationally tailored to any such computations.”); Ben Grunwald & Jeffrey 
Fagan, The End of Intuition-Based High-Crime Areas, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 345, 345 (2019). 
 50. See generally Jonathan P. Feingold & Evelyn R. Carter, Eyes Wide Open: What Social Science 
Can Tell Us About the Supreme Court’s Use of Social Science, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1689 (2018) 
(discussing how common cognitive biases and heuristics interact with racial stereotypes). 
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perceptions of school quality even in the face of concrete 
countervailing evidence.51 This is even more likely if our parent 
recently read about litigation—such as Gary B.—that emphasized 
dire educational conditions in Black and Brown communities.52 
To better illustrate this dynamic, a 2008 study from sociologist 
Maria Krysan and colleagues exposes how racialized deficit frames 
could exacerbate neighborhood profiling and thereby entrench racial 
segregation.53 For the study, participants viewed one of thirteen brief 
videos. Each video depicted a neighborhood across one of five 
socioeconomic tiers and one of three racial compositions.54 The racial 
compositions included: all white, all Black, and racially mixed.55 
Immediately after viewing the video, participants answered several 
questions. First, participants rated the neighborhood across five 
characteristics: (a) home costs, (b) property upkeep, (c) safety, 
(d) future property values, and (e) school quality.56 Then, to measure 
explicit racial stereotypes, participants rated whites and Blacks 
vis-à-vis each of the following statements, each of which implicated 
a distinct group trait: 
(1) tend to be intelligent or tend to be unintelligent; (2) tend 
to prefer to be self-supporting or tend to prefer to live off 
welfare; (3) tend to be involved with street crime or gangs 
or tend to not be involved with street crime or gangs; and 
(4) tend to do a good job of supervising their children or 
tend to do a bad job of supervising their children.57 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. See generally Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020); L. Song Richardson & Phillip 
Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 308 (2012) (discussing the 
availability heuristic); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974) (same). 
 53. See generally Krysan et al., supra note 41. 
 54. Id. at 12. Socioeconomic tiers included: “lower working class,” “upper working class,” 
“blemished middle class,” “unblemished middle class,” and “upper middle class.” Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 13. 
 57. Id. 
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As with prior research, (a) participants tended to hold pro-white 
biases and (b) racial biases predicted neighborhood evaluations.58 
Krysan et al. describe their findings: 
[O]ur results are consistent with the notion that 
neighborhood evaluations are socially constructed. When 
identical neighborhoods are shown to respondents—and 
only the race of the residents varies—Whites nevertheless 
downgrade their evaluations of the features of that 
neighborhood when there are Black residents.59 
A statistically significant race effect emerged on four of the five 
neighborhood traits.60 This included perceptions of property values 
and school quality—even when participants encountered concrete 
evidence that should have countered the prevailing profile.61 In other 
words, “neighborhoods with the exact same observable 
characteristics [were] presumed by Whites to be lower-quality 
neighborhoods simply because of the race of the residents.”62 
Notably, self-reported—that is, explicit—racial biases mediated 
neighborhood evaluations.63 To begin, participants exhibited 
pro-white biases across the four measured group traits.64 With respect 
to general intelligence, for example, over 40% of “Whites said their 
own race tended to be more intelligent than Blacks.”65  
 
 58. Id. at 18. 
 59. Krysan et al., supra note 41, at 20. 
 60. Id. at 15. 
 61. Id. at 20. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 5. 
 64. Id. at 15. This tracks other research. See, e.g., Jason A. Okonofua et al., A Vicious Cycle: A 
Social–Psychological Account of Extreme Racial Disparities in School Discipline, 11 PERSPS. ON 
PSYCH. SCI. 381, 384 (2016) (“Blacks are commonly stereotyped as unintelligent, lazy, hostile, and 
dangerous.”). 
 65. Krysan et al., supra note 41, at 16–17 (“About the same percentage (44%) endorsed the belief 
that Blacks were more likely than Whites to ‘prefer to live off welfare.’ The idea that Blacks tend to be 
more involved in crimes and gangs than Whites was endorsed by over 70% of Whites, and a majority of 
Whites (54%) also thought that Whites as a race tended to do a better job of raising their children than 
Blacks.”). 
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And, critically, bias predicted behavior. Participants with average 
pro-white bias rated white neighborhoods, relative to otherwise 
identical Black neighborhoods, 0.36 points higher for safety and 0.30 
points higher for school quality.66 For high prejudice individuals,67 
who exhibited stereotypes one standard deviation above the mean, 
those gaps jumped to 0.54 and 0.46, respectively.68 Notably, these 
differences emerged even in higher-class neighborhoods—that is, 
neighborhoods where one might expect class cues to overcome 
underlying presumptions and profiles. The authors describe this 
dynamic as follows: 
[W]hen looking for housing, prospective White residents 
may be shown by a real estate agent, for example, a Black 
or racially mixed neighborhood that has many positive 
features. But these may not be sufficient to overcome their 
negative predispositions about the neighborhood. This is 
because the very perception of the features of the 
neighborhood is colored by the race of its residents.69 
Before proceeding, it is worth reiterating that individual behavior 
is neither the only, nor most important variable that drives racial 
segregation. Still, personal decisions matter. Given the weight 
homeowners place on school quality, even small gradients in 
perceived difference can have significant consequences. In the 
aggregate, individual decisions can reproduce and calcify residential 
housing patterns that effectively render well-resourced schools 
inaccessible to students of color. And as Krysan et al. illustrate, this 
behavior often trades on ostensibly “rational” discrimination more 
 
 66. Id. at 17. 
 67. Id. Highly biased participants rated whites “2.1 points ahead of Blacks as a group on each of the 
[four measured traits].” Id. 
 68. Id. at 19 (“We show that those Whites who more frequently endorse negative racial stereotypes 
were more strongly influenced by the race of residents than those who endorsed fewer of the 
stereotypes.”). 
 69. Id. at 20. 
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informed by racial biases than actual neighborhood characteristics.70 
For school financing litigants, this dynamic implicates legal 
narratives that reduce communities of color to poverty and academic 
underachievement. Such frames, even if pragmatic from a litigation 
perspective, can reify the racial logics that fuel neighborhood 
profiling.71 
B. Teachers: Same Performance, Different Score 
As referenced supra, pervasive societal stereotypes often subject 
Black and Brown communities to presumptions of intellectual 
inferiority.72 These pernicious presumptions extend to students as 
well. Even accepting the prevalence of such negative expectations, 
one might expect that teachers can overcome their own biases when a 
student’s individual performance contravenes group-based 
stereotypes. The trouble is, stereotypes and the deleterious 
expectations they create are harder to escape than we might presume.  
When we encounter someone from a stereotyped social category, 
“characteristics that are associated with the [person’s] group as a 
whole can be inductively applied to this person.”73 This occurs 
automatically and even if we lack any additional information about 
that individual.74 Critically, stereotypes do more than conjure default 
expectations. Those expectations also inform how we perceive, 
interpret, and even remember an individual and their behavior.75 
 
 70. Id. at 16. 
 71. See Ramasubramanian, supra note 24, at 106 (“Because of the chronic accessibility of racial 
stereotypes, even subtle racial cues in the media are sufficient to activate racial attitudes that influence 
decision making without requiring conscious effort.”). 
 72. See Okonofua et al., supra note 64; Jordan G. Starck et al., Teachers Are People Too: Examining 
the Racial Bias of Teachers Compared to Other American Adults, 49 EDUC. RESEARCHER 273, 279 
(2020). Over 30% of teachers responding to a survey exhibited the belief that Black parents value 
education less than white parents. Holly Kurtz, Educators Support Black Lives Matter, but Still Want 
Police in Schools, Survey Shows, EDUC. WEEK: EQUITY & DIVERSITY (June 25, 2020), 
https://www.edweek.org/leadership/educators-support-black-lives-matter-but-still-want-police-in-
schools-survey-shows/2020/06 [https://perma.cc/DR6K-LFCP]. 
 73. Galen V. Bodenhausen & Andrew R. Todd, Social Cognition, 1 WILEY INTERDISC. REV.: 
COGNITIVE SCI. 160, 164 (2010). 
 74. See Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, supra note 22, at 10. 
 75. Bodenhausen & Todd, supra note 73, at 164–65 (explaining that “stereotypes do not consist 
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Social psychologists Galen Bodenhausen and Kurt Hugenberg 
explain this process: 
After a target is assigned to a particular category, such as a 
racial group, general attitudes toward that group create 
expectancies of positive or negative characteristics that can 
bias perception of the target’s behavior.76 
Translated to the classroom, racialized expectations about 
academic competence threaten the basic goal of equal treatment—
that is, the simple promise that the same performance will yield the 
same evaluation.77 A seminal study from John Darley and Paget 
Gross is instructive.78 Darley and Gross examined whether a 
student’s socioeconomic status would affect how evaluators viewed 
her academic potential.79 The researchers predicted (a) that the 
student’s perceived class would create negative or positive 
expectations about her academic ability, and (b) that the prevailing 
expectation would influence how participants rated the student’s 
academic performance.80 
To test this hypothesis, Darley and Gross showed participants a 
videotape of nine-year-old “Hannah,” a white public school student, 
engaging in several academic tasks.81 To manipulate expectations, 
half of the participants learned that Hannah lived in “an urban, 
 
merely of lists of features possessed by a group” and “stereotypes can bias attention and perception in a 
number of ways”). 
 76. Bodenhausen & Hugenberg, supra note 22, at 10. 
 77. By “basic goal of equal treatment,” I mean social category disparate treatment in the “but for” 
causation sense. See Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
1357, 1371 (2017) (“The canonical formulation focuses on causation: ‘treatment of a person in a manner 
which but for that person’s [race] . . . would be different.’”). I am not suggesting that avoiding “but for” 
disparate treatment should be the goal from an equality standpoint. For reasons that exceed the scope of 
this Article, such a vision would be both under- and over-inclusive. 
 78. See generally John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling 
Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 20 (1983). 
 79. Id. at 20. 
 80. Id. at 22. 
 81. Id. at 23. 
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low-income area (negative expectancy).”82 The other half learned that 
Hannah lived in a “middle-class, suburban setting (positive 
expectancy).”83 
After viewing the video, participants rated Hannah across three 
principal dimensions: ability measures, performance measures, and 
supplementary academic measures.84 Ability measures, most relevant 
here, required participants to identify Hannah’s grade level in 
reading, mathematics, and liberal arts.85 Supplementary academic 
measures required participants to evaluate Hannah across five trait 
clusters: work habits, motivation, sociability, maturity, and cognitive 
skills.86 
To repeat, all participants viewed the same video of the same child 
performing the same tasks. The only difference was exposure to 
information about Hannah’s socioeconomic status. This detail 
mattered; it affected how participants perceived Hannah’s existing 
competence and potential. Across all measures, “wealthy” Hannah 
received higher evaluations than “poor” Hannah.87 In grade level 
placement, for example, “wealthy” Hannah received mean scores of 
4.83, 4.67, and 4.10 in liberal arts, reading, and mathematics, 
respectively.88 “Poor” Hannah, in contrast, received corresponding 
grade placements of 3.79, 3.71, and 3.04.89 All three gaps, which 
approached or exceeded a full grade level, reached statistical and 
practical significance. 
As expected, Hannah’s socioeconomic status activated 
stereotype-laden expectations about Hannah’s academic abilities and 
potential. Those expectations then shaped how participants 
interpreted Hannah’s actual performance. This dynamic—which 
 
 82. Id. at 22. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Darley & Gross, supra note 78, at 23–24. 
 85. Id. at 24. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 26 (“On every measure, positive-expectancy subjects made interpretations more favorable 
to the child than did negative-expectancy subjects.”). 
 88. Id. at 24. 
 89. Id. 
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tethers stereotypes, expectations, and teacher conduct—implicates 
racial biases as well. Among other things, it helps explain why Black 
and Brown students routinely confront unfounded presumptions of 
intellectual inferiority even when their individual characteristics—
from trajectory (e.g., growing up in a middle-class community) to 
accomplishments (e.g., attending an elite university)—contradict 
those very presumptions.90 These presumptions, in turn, render 
students susceptible to the same biased behavior that “poor” Hannah 
faced.91 
A 2014 study by Arin Reeves captures this precise threat.92 Reeves 
invited lawyers to participate in what was characterized as a general 
writing exercise.93 During the exercise, each participant evaluated a 
legal memo from a fictional junior associate.94 All participants 
received the same legal memo.95 To manipulate race, half of the 
participants received a cover letter indicating the memo’s author was 
“African American”; the other half received a cover letter indicating 
the memo’s author was “Caucasian.”96 
Across general and specific criteria, the “Caucasian” memo 
received more favorable quantitative and qualitative evaluations. On 
a five-point scale, the “African American” memo received an average 
score of 3.2; the “Caucasian” memo, in contrast, received a score of 
4.1.97 This disparate treatment transcended general feedback. With 
respect to spelling and grammar, participants identified an average of 
 
 90. See Feingold & Carter, supra note 50, at 1707 (introducing the concept of an “elite student 
paradigm” to capture the presumption of academic incompetence that follows Black and Brown 
students). 
 91. Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning 
Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1199 (2010). 
 92. See generally ARIN REEVES, NEXTIONS YELLOW PAPER SERIES, WRITTEN IN BLACK & WHITE: 
EXPLORING CONFIRMATION BIAS IN RACIALIZED EXPECTATIONS OF WRITING SKILLS (2014), 
http://nextions.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/written-in-black-and-white-yellow-paper-series.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/LMB6-ZBZF]. 
 93. Id. at 3. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 4. 
 97. Id. 
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5.8 (out of 7.0) total mistakes in the “African American” memo, yet 
only 2.9 total mistakes in the “Caucasian” memo.98 
The foregoing studies, albeit limited data points, illustrate how 
stereotypes can generate expectations that burden students even in 
the presence of countervailing information. This dynamic implicates 
the potential downstream consequences of legal narratives that track 
and reinforce racial stereotypes. Consider, again, Gary B.99 The 
plaintiffs do not suggest that their dire educational conditions afflict 
all—or even most—Black and Brown students.100 On the contrary, 
they stress the uniquely troubling state of their schools.101 
Nonetheless, by mobilizing a narrative of Black and Brown poverty 
and academic underachievement, the litigation reproduces racial 
tropes that rationalize low expectations about Black and Brown 
students.102 These expectations, in turn, render teachers more likely 
to discriminate against their own Black and Brown students—
regardless of the students’ connection (or lack thereof) to Gary B. 
C. Voters: When Racial Disparities Beget Regressive Policies 
In Catch 22s, I note that school financing doctrine—among other 
areas of civil rights law—is not the only force that motivates racial 
justice advocates to employ deficit frames.103 Conventional wisdom 
 
 98. REEVES, supra note 92. 
 99. See generally Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Christopher Peak & Emily Hanford, In Gary B. v. Snyder, a Federal Court Rules Giving 
Children a Chance at Literacy Is a Constitutional Right, HECHINGER REP. (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://hechingerreport.org/in-gary-b-v-snyder-a-federal-court-rules-giving-children-a-chance-at-
literacy-is-a-constitutional-right/ [https://perma.cc/KVF9-HBLH] (“Evan Caminker, a law professor and 
former dean at the University of Michigan law school who worked on the case, said that Gary B. v. 
Snyder was ‘surgically precise’ in seeking remedies for kids in ‘the worst of the worst schools. This 
lawsuit is not designed to cure all evil, so to speak. This lawsuit is designed to show that there are 
particular pockets, where we would say it’s not just that the kids are not becoming literate; it’s that they 
don’t have the opportunity to become literate,’ he said.”). 
 102. See Devon W. Carbado et al., Privileged or Mismatched: The Lose-Lose Position of African 
Americans in the Affirmative Action Debate, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 174, 177 (2016) (“That the 
mismatch theory at least implicitly relies on longstanding ‘reasonable doubt’ about black intellectual 
competence and capacity makes it all the more important that scholars and policymakers carefully 
examine the empirical basis for the theory.”). 
 103. See Feingold, supra note 1. 
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is also at play. Specifically, many on the Left presume that 
“bombarding the public with images and statistics documenting the 
plight of minorities will motivate people to fight inequality.”104 I 
appreciate the logic. The trouble is, recent research from social 
psychologists Rebecca Hetey and Jennifer Eberhardt paints a 
sobering picture.105 Across two studies, rather than galvanize public 
support for reform, exposing whites “to a world with extreme racial 
stratification increase[d] their support for the policies that help to 
maintain that stratification.”106 
In one of the studies,107 Hetey and Eberhardt explored whether 
exposure to more extreme racial disparities would alter public 
support for New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy.108 Study 
participants, who were white, received demographic information 
about New York’s inmate population.109 In the “less-Black” 
condition, participants read that the prison population was 40.3% 
Black.110 In the “more-Black” condition, participants read that the 
prison population was 60.3% Black.111 Across conditions, 
participants learned that a judge had recently ruled that the 
stop-and-frisk policy was unconstitutional and that the City was 
appealing.112 After receiving this information, participants answered 
several questions about the policy and crime more broadly.113 
To conclude the study, participants were shown a sample petition 
to end stop-and-frisk and asked the following question: “If you had 
been approached by someone and asked to sign a petition like the one 
 
 104. Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 10, at 1952. 
 105. Id. at 1950 (observing that white support for punitive policies increased after exposure to more 
severe racial disparities). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. (describing a companion study employed a similar format but targeted white California 
residents). 
 108. Id. at 1951. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 10, at 1951 (this number approximated the percentage of Black 
inmates in the United States). 
 111. Id. (this number approximated the percentage of Black inmates in New York City correctional 
facilities). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
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you just read, would you have signed it?”114 Participants could 
answer “yes” or “no.”115 
Consistent with a companion study, participants in the 
“more-Black” condition were “significantly less willing” to support 
reform.116 In other words, exposure to higher racial disparities 
increased support for a regressive policy—even when participants 
viewed that policy as punitive.117 For the studies’ authors, this 
prompted the following question: What was driving an effect that 
seemed to contradict conventional wisdom? 
A dynamic between racial disparities and racial stereotypes 
provided an answer. To begin, Hetey and Eberhardt discovered that 
participants in the “more-Black” condition “were significantly more 
concerned about crime.”118 As fear of crime increased, participants 
became less willing to sign a petition to end stop-and-frisk.119 As the 
authors’ explain: 
[E]xposing people to extreme racial disparities in the prison 
population heightened their fear of crime and increased 
acceptance of the very policies that lead to those disparities. 
Thus, institutionalized disparities can be 
self-perpetuating.120 
Albeit dispiriting, this finding tracks empirical scholarship on the 
phenomenon of racial priming.121 Priming occurs when exposure to 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 10, at 1952. Thirty-three percent of participants in the “less-
Black” condition would have signed the petition. This number dropped to 12% in the “more-Black” 
condition. Id. 
 117. Id. (noting that this effect was significant and remained regardless of a participant’s views 
concerning the policy’s punitiveness). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and Cognitive Control in 
Race-Based Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 384, 384 (2002). Priming 
can occur through exposure to characteristics associated with a social category. See Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 
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racial cues activates group-based stereotypes—such as the 
association between blackness and criminality.122 Priming occurs 
automatically and beyond our conscious awareness.123 Once 
activated, the relevant stereotype “increases the likelihood that the 
knowledge contained in the stereotype will be used in subsequent 
judgments.”124 In other words, when race is made salient, perceivers 
are more likely to interpret information in ways that confirm related 
racial stereotypes.125 
Translated to the Hetey and Eberhardt study, the bare “evidence of 
racial disparities in the criminal justice system” appears to have 
“activate[d] [or heightened] implicit stereotypical associations 
linking blackness with crime, violence, threat, and aggression.”126 
For participants in the “more-Black” condition, exposure to greater 
racial inequity rendered the association more salient. Participants, in 
turn, exhibited greater fear of crime and less support for reform.127 
Moreover, as the authors explain, if evidence of racial inequality 
“triggers the stereotype that Blacks are criminals and criminals are 
Black, then such information is no longer concerning on its face.”128 
In other words, beyond heightening crime concerns, the Black-crime 
 
876, 876–81 (2004) (noting, for example, that a story about crime can trigger racial stereotypes 
associated with blackness). 
 122. See Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. 
REV. 871, 879 (2015) (“Priming seeks to assess whether and to what degree exposure to a concept or 
object (e.g., a black face) automatically activates stereotypes (e.g., ‘black people are hostile’) or shapes 
stereotype-congruent responses to race-neutral prompts (e.g., rating an ambiguous shove as more 
aggressive).”). 
 123. Travis L. Dixon, Psychological Reactions to Crime News Portrayals of Black Criminals: 
Understanding the Moderating Roles of Prior News Viewing and Stereotype Endorsement, 73 
COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 162, 164 (2006). 
 124. Id. at 166. 
 125. See Bodenhausen & Hugenberg supra note 22, at 3 (“[N]ot all stimuli in the perceptual field 
receive equal attention; instead, some stimuli are selected for relatively intense scrutiny, making them 
more likely to reach the threshold of awareness, while others are processed only superficially, receiving 
little of our precious attention.”). 
 126. Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, The Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves: Racial 
Disparities and the Persistence of Inequality in the Criminal Justice System, 27 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCH. SCI. 183, 185 (2018); see also Dixon, supra note 123, at 167 (“Previous research suggests that 
crime news featuring more African Americans than Whites could lead to the activation and use of a 
‘Black criminal’ stereotype.”). 
 127. Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 10, at 1952. 
 128. Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 126. 
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association—when salient—rationalizes racial inequality as the 
product of group-based pathologies or predispositions, not 
environmental forces that render certain people more vulnerable to 
state violence.129 
To summarize, Hetey and Eberhardt illuminate how exposure to 
racial disparities can (a) activate anti-Black stereotypes, which 
thereby (b) entrench white support for the status quo.130 These studies 
focused on the intersection of race and crime. For multiple reasons, 
one might expect similar backlash to across domains laden with 
anti-Black bias and contemporary disparities.  
This includes higher education. One might expect, for example, a 
parallel phenomenon to impact public perceptions of, and support 
for, racial affirmative action in university admissions.  
To begin, recall the pathway observed supra: (1) individuals are 
exposed to racial disparities; (2) those disparities activate 
domain-relevant racial stereotypes (the greater the disparity, the more 
salient the stereotype); and (3) participants become more likely to 
rationalize the status quo and less likely to support reform. Against 
this backdrop, we can pivot from the domain of crime to education. 
To do so, we shift two key details. First, rather than exposing 
participants to racially disparate prison populations, we expose them 
to racially disparate admissions statistics. Second, rather than invite 
participants to support a specific criminal justice reform (e.g., 
eliminating “stop-and-frisk”), we invite them to support a specific 
education reform (e.g., race-conscious admissions). 
Racial stereotypes pervade the domain of education. The 
association between blackness and intellectual inferiority, for 
example, “has long been an important part of the social transcript of 
American life.”131 For decades, this stereotype—alongside other 
 
 129. Id. at 184 (“An alternative interpretation is that members of particular racial groups must be 
doing something—namely committing crime—to capture the attention of police and be imprisoned at 
higher rates. By focusing on group traits [e.g., over-incarceration], the possibility that structural bias is 
at play in creating disparities falls out of view.”). 
 130. Id.; see also Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 10. 
 131. Carbado et al., supra note 102 (“Indeed, perhaps the only thing easier in the United States, 
racially speaking, than questioning black intellectual ability is associating African Americans with 
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anti-Black biases—has underwritten our national affirmative action 
discourse.132 Consider dominant affirmative action positions from the 
Right and the Left; both defenders and opponents of race-conscious 
admissions routinely assume that such practices confer a “racial 
preference” on their beneficiaries.133 Critical Race Theorists have 
long resisted this framing by highlighting how racial affirmative 
action is often needed to counter race- and class-based advantages 
embedded within standard admissions regimes.134 Nonetheless, the 
dominant framing that positions “presumptively unqualified” Blacks 
against “innocent and meritorious” whites continues to pervade lay 
and legal discourse.135 In other words, dominant discourse from both 
sides of the affirmative action debate presume Black intellectual 
inferiority. 
Drawing on Hetey and Eberhardt, imagine a study that invites 
participants to sign a petition to reinstate racial affirmative action in 
their state.136 How might exposure to extreme racial admission gaps 
affect participant behavior? To begin, exposure to disparities could 
activate (or heighten) pervasive anti-Black stereotypes such as 
intellectual incompetence and laziness.137 The now-primed 
stereotypes, in turn, could render participants more likely to expect 
 
crime.”). 
 132. See id. 
 133. Id. at 188 (“Both conservatives and liberals regularly refer to affirmative action as a thumb on 
the scale and both conceptualize the policy as a preference. As noted earlier, the basic difference 
between conservative and liberal positions on affirmative action is that whereas liberals believe that the 
costs of affirmative action are outweighed by the benefits (including diversity), conservatives perceive 
the costs of the policy (including “reverse discrimination”) to be too high.”). For an early rebuke of this 
“preference” frame, see Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of 
Preferential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 4 (1994). 
 134. See Carbado et al., supra note 102. 
 135. Id. (“Cheryl Harris has suggested that the reason arguments about mismatch are almost always 
rehearsed with reference to African Americans is because the mismatch thesis aligns with preexisting 
notions of black intellectual deficit.”). 
 136. In November 2020, California voters rejected a ballot measure that would have permitted the 
state to reinstate racial affirmative action in university admissions, among other contexts. See Janie Har, 
Politically Liberal California Rejects Affirmative Action, AP NEWS (Nov. 4, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/article/race-and-ethnicity-campaigns-san-francisco-college-admissions-california-
4c56c600c86f37289e435be85695872a [https://perma.cc/A7VY-NN8D]. 
 137. See Ramasubramanian, supra note 25, at 507. 
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and rationalize disparities, which they might attribute to neutral 
market forces that reward academic merit and effort—not a biased 
admissions regime that rewards inherited race and class advantage.138 
Accordingly, one might expect these participants to grow more 
hostile to affirmative action—which they see as contrary to basic 
commitments to neutrality and meritocracy.139 
This pathway, which begins with exposure to racial inequality and 
ends with antipathy toward affirmative action, is largely theoretical. 
But it is not without empirical support. Consider a 2011 study from 
Professor Srividya Ramasubramanian.140 Professor 
Ramasubramanian had two principal inquiries. First, she asked 
whether “internal attributions for out-group failures” would mediate 
support for affirmative action.141 Second, she asked whether exposure 
to stereotypical versus counterstereotypical exemplars would 
influence how participants viewed racial achievement gaps.142 
The study proceeded as follows. Roughly 350 white 
undergraduates viewed images of counterstereotypical or 
stereotypical Black media characters.143 Participants then completed 
a series of tasks to measure (a) racial stereotypes, (b) explanations for 
out-group failure, and (c) support for affirmative action.144 
Consistent with prior scholarship, “[s]tereotypical beliefs 
regarding African American criminality and laziness were fairly 
high.”145 Even here, the condition mattered. Participants in the 
 
 138. See generally Jonathan Feingold, ‘All (Poor) Lives Matter’: How Class-Not-Race Logic 
Reinscribes Race and Class Privilege, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 47 (2020) (explaining how wealthy 
white applicants tend to receive unearned race and class advantages from facially race-neutral 
admissions criteria). 
 139. For a forceful argument that affirmative action is often necessary to mitigate race and class 
privileges baked into standard admissions processes, see Devon W. Carbado, Footnote 43: Recovering 
Justice Powell’s Anti-Preference Framing of Affirmative Action, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1117, 1121–22 
(2019). 
 140. See Ramasubramanian, supra note 25, at 507. 
 141. Id. at 498. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 504 (noting that although an imperfect fit, the stereotypical exemplar arguably maps onto 
the “more-Black” condition from the Hetey and Eberhardt study and that both render domain-relevant 
stereotypes more salient). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 507. 
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stereotypical condition exhibited stronger anti-Black stereotypes than 
those in the counterstereotypical condition.146 Heightened 
stereotypical beliefs, in turn, “led to internal attributions for failures 
of African Americans, increased prejudicial feelings toward African 
Americans, and ultimately reduced support for affirmative action 
policies.”147 
Notably, the “statistically significant, direct relationship between 
stereotypical beliefs and support for affirmative action 
policies . . . became nonsignificant when ‘[i]nternal causes for 
out-group failures’ was included as a mediating variable.”148 In other 
words, participants who embraced internal theories of inequality 
(e.g., personal disposition or cultural deficiency) were less likely to 
support affirmative action than those who embraced external theories 
of inequality (e.g., unequal access to social capital).149 And, 
critically, participants were more likely to embrace internal theories 
if they viewed a stereotypical media character. 
To be clear, the foregoing studies do not, in themselves, prove that 
exposure to academic achievement gaps will suppress support for 
affirmative action. Still, the social science suggests that the risk is 
real and reaffirms the power of stereotypes to shape behavior.150 In so 
doing, the studies expose how racialized deficit frames can thwart 
antiracist reform by entrenching support for the status quo.151 
Now, to conclude, I turn to a final stakeholder: administrators. 
 
 146. Ramasubramanian, supra note 25, at 508. This effect reached statistical significance for laziness. 
Id. (“[Participants] exposed to negative out-group exemplars (M = 4.89, SD = 0.063) were significantly 
more likely than those exposed to positive out-group exemplars (M = 4.63, SD = 0.080) to report 
stereotypical beliefs about African Americans as lazy . . . .”). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 509. Albeit “quite low” across all conditions, support for affirmative action “was 
significantly and negatively correlated with stereotypical beliefs, individual attributions, and prejudicial 
feelings.” Id. at 507. Notably, participants “exposed to counterstereotypical exemplars reported more 
support [for affirmative action] than those in the stereotypical condition but these differences did not 
attain statistical significance.” Id. at 507. 
 149. Id. at 507. 
 150. Id. at 510 (“[The] [f]indings support the notion that media characters activate stereotypes of 
African Americans among White audiences . . . .”). 
 151. Id. (“[T]he findings . . . could be similarly interpreted to mean that negative media characters 
increase negative stereotypical beliefs, internal attributions, and lack of pro-minority policy support.”). 
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D. Administrators: Misdiagnosing Institutional Deficiencies as 
Student Deficiencies 
Administrators enjoy unique power to shape equal learning 
environments. To appreciate how deficit frames that foreground 
poverty and illiteracy could compromise such efforts, consider the 
following hypothetical. 
Imagine a well-resourced public high school. The school boasts a 
wealth of economic resources and a team of dedicated teachers, 
administrative staff, and senior leaders. The student body is 
predominately white. Last year, following nationwide racial justice 
protests, a coalition of students and parents challenged the school to 
prioritize diversity and inclusion. In response, the Dean appointed a 
committee to identify areas of concern and corresponding 
prescriptions. Through its work, the committee discovers that, on 
average, Black students receive lower grades than their white peers. 
Armed with the data, the committee begins drafting 
recommendations designed to close this achievement gap. 
Just as the drafting commences, national attention turns to a 
high-profile school financing lawsuit. The suit features low-income 
Black and Brown students who are challenging educational 
conditions in their primary and secondary schools. As in Gary B., the 
plaintiffs frame the case through a narrative that emphasizes student 
underachievement and community plight.152 We could ask, 
accordingly, how exposure to this framing might inform the 
committee’s response to racial disparities at its school? 
To begin, the litigation mobilizes a narrative that tracks pervasive 
and pernicious stereotypes about Black and Brown students and the 
communities in which they live. Exposure to the litigation, 
accordingly, could prime those very stereotypes for committee 
members.153 Once activated, the stereotypes are more likely to shape 
 
 152. See generally Gary B. v. Whitmer, 957 F.3d 616 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 153. Even without the litigation, committee members could interpret the performance data as 
evidence supporting pre-existing racialized presumptions about academic competence—presumptions 
that trade on anti-Black stereotypes. See Ramasubramanian, supra note 25, at 506. 
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how the committee interprets its school’s own racial disparities—
even if its students have no connection to the lawsuit. Moreover, the 
committee might adopt internal causal theories (e.g., student 
deficiencies) to explain the observed gap.154 In other words, when 
achievement gaps are viewed through a stereotype-laden lens, the 
committee is more likely to attribute those disparities to actual and 
expected differences in ability, preparation, and motivation—not, for 
example, teacher bias or environmental forces that uniquely tax 
students of color.155 
Further, a cognitive bias known as the “ultimate attribution error” 
could amplify this dynamic for white committee members.156 This 
well-studied bias leads people to “view negative attributes of 
outgroups as stable, fixed, and dispositional.”157 In contrast, negative 
traits or outcomes associated with ingroup members “are viewed as 
malleable, contingent, and a result of environment or bad luck.”158 
With respect to positive traits, the reverse occurs.159 
In effect, exposure to litigation that deploys a narrative of Black 
and Brown academic underachievement could trigger a 
social-cognition cocktail that leads committee members to: (a) expect 
Black and Brown students to underperform relative to their peers 
and (b) identify student deficits as the cause.160 A corresponding 
 
 154. See id. Standard causal theories fall into one of two categories: internal explanations or external 
explanations. See Mark Peffley & Jon Hurwitz, Persuasion and Resistance: Race and the Death Penalty 
in America, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 996, 999 (2007) (noting that internal explanations attribute disparities to 
individual or group-based traits while external explanations attribute inequality to situational or 
environmental factors). 
 155. See Jonathan P. Feingold, Hidden in Plain Sight: A More Compelling Case for Diversity, 2019 
UTAH L. REV. 59, 65 (discussing how students of color often confront uneven conditions within 
predominately white institutions). 
 156. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s Cognitive 
Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 461, 461 (1979). 
 157. Kang & Lane, supra note 11, at 516 (describing “motivations to justify the self and the groups 
we belong to slant how we use or fail to use base-rate information”); see also Eric Luis Uhlmann et al., 
The Motivated Use and Neglect of Base Rates, 30 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 284, 285 (2007). 
 158. Kang & Lane, supra note 11, at 516; see also Okonofua et al., supra note 64 (noting that 
“associations can alter . . . attributions about misbehavior and result in harsher punishment decisions” 
and finding that “teachers were more likely to label a misbehaving Black middle school student as a 
troublemaker than they were a misbehaving White middle school student”). 
 159. Kang & Lane, supra note 11, at 516. 
 160. Cf. Feingold & Carter, supra note 50, at 1708 (describing how an “elite student paradigm” 
 
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2021], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss4/8
2021] DEFICIT FRAME DANGERS 1263 
prescription, in turn, might prioritize individualized remedial efforts 
designed to improve the academic skills of “damaged” Black and 
Brown students.161 
This recommendation, which presupposes deficient students, is as 
significant for what it prescribes as for what it omits. When the 
problem is defined as “unprepared” or “unmotivated” students, 
administrators tend to overlook the myriad environmental forces that 
often subject Black and Brown students to identity-contingent 
headwinds that their white counterparts never face. Accordingly, by 
defaulting to perceived student shortcomings, the committee may 
misdiagnose institutional deficiencies (that is, the failure to provide 
an equal learning environment) as student deficiencies (that is, 
insufficient preparation or motivation).162 
The point is not that institutional deficiencies, alone, explain all 
racial gaps all the time. But far too often, administrators fail to even 
consider whether disparities derive, even in part, from environmental 
forces that uniquely burden certain students because of their racial 
identity.163 As a result, institutions invite a vicious feedback loop. To 
begin, existing institutional environments subject students of color to 
identity-contingent headwinds. Those headwinds produce or 
exacerbate racial achievement gaps. The achievement gaps activate 
and reinforce racialized presumptions of incompetence. 
Administrators, in turn, target individualized remedies instead of 
 
“renders Black students perpetual outsiders to the elite institution”). 
 161. See Luke Charles Harris, Beyond the Best Black: The Making of a Critical Race Theorist at Yale 
Law School, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1379, 1403 (2011) (“The focus of our concern would shift from a story 
about damaged individuals to a story about damaged institutions . . . .”).  
 162. Cf. Rosalee A. Clawson & Rakuya Trice, Poverty As We Know It, 64 PUB. OP. Q. 53, 61 (2000) 
(“Thus, if attitudes on poverty-related issues are driven by inaccurate and stereotypical portrayals of the 
poor, then the policies favored by the public (and political elites) may not adequately address the true 
problems of poverty.”). 
 163. See Feingold, supra note 155 (discussing how environmental forces can compromise students’ 
rights to “equal university membership”). 
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structural interventions necessary to create an environment in which 
every student is positioned to thrive.164 Wash and repeat. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, my goal has been to concretize the deficit frame 
dangers I surfaced in Catch 22s.165 The examples included herein are 
illustrative, not exhaustive. And in many respects, the theory remains 
provisional. Nonetheless, these examples expose how well-meaning 
litigation and legal narratives can compromise near- and long-term 
projects of racial equality across educational domains. Above all, I 
hope to spark further conversation concerning the relationship 
between racial narratives—whether arising in litigation or 




 164. See generally Stacy Hawkins, Reverse Integration: Centering HBCUs in the Fight for 
Educational Equality, 24 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 351 (2021) (comparing the overwhelming success 
of HBCUs to successfully train and educate Black students to the consistent failure of predominately 
white institutions). 
 165. See Feingold, supra note 1. 
30
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2021], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss4/8
